Introduction
Although it may be too early to write the obituary for the Constitutional Treaty, the French and Dutch no votes make it unlikely that it will be ratified without some major revisions. This will take years. In the meantime, a number of less contested and much-needed innovations in the area of EU foreign policy have been put on hold, such as the establishment of a permanent president of the European Council; a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, merging the posts of Germany) has revived the notion of a directoire-an EU "Security Council" of sorts-to lead an ever larger Union of 25. This raises the question whether the Foreign Minister would, indeed, receive the backing needed from large and small member states alike in order to exert the political leadership that the Union so desperately needs in order to fulfil its ambitions as a global actor.
1 Of course, significant parts of the EU's external relations portfolio is and will be managed by the Commission and its President, Jose Manuel Barosso, even with a double-hatted Foreign Minister, into which the post of External Relations Commissioner, currently held by Benita Ferrero Waldner, would be merged. This paper does not, therefore, address the whole question of who speaks on behalf of the EU, but discusses rather external representation within the CFSP and the extent to which the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty would lead to better coordination between the Council and the Commission.
So far the EU has made do with, quoting Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, "glorified ad hocery", whereby a number of new institutions, mechanisms and posts have been established en route (Everts and Keohane 2003: 178) . This, on the one hand, shows some remarkable flexibility on behalf of the Union, yet it is deemed to be reactive in nature and hardly suited to ensuring a consistent and efficient foreign policy. On the other hand, developments have been largely away from the public eye, and the transfer of responsibility from the Commission to the Council in areas such as civilian crisis management has removed it from the scrutiny of the European Parliament-to the further detriment of the Union's already problematic democratic deficit. If the EU is to fulfil its stated ambitions, therefore, it needs to do better on legitimacy, while developing consistent, coherent and proactive foreign policy leadership.
This requires the far-sightedness and political entrepreneurship of a person with the political weight of Solana, but he/she must be embedded in an appropriate institutional framework. Yet nothing can be done without the backing of the member states, which need to feel a sense of ownership over EU foreign policy. This paper evaluates the present status of this "trilemma", taking as a point of departure the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Treaty.
Who Shall Lead? The Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty
The establishment of the post of a Union Foreign Minister, if or when agreed, would represent two major innovations in the foreign policy area: First, it would largely replace the role of the Presidency as the official driver for and voice on matters falling under the CFSP. Secondly, it would bring together the functions of High Representative for the CFSP (HR-CFSP) and
Commissioner for External Relations, thereby, at least in theory, improving coordination between first and second pillar instruments. As regards the former, the current arrangement of having the Presidency rotate between the member states every six months is widely recognised as inefficient and overtly susceptible to national politicisation. It has largely outplayed the role it once had in bringing different issues to the forefront, whereas the EU's growing foreign policy portfolio makes it virtually impossible for the member state holding the Presidency to keep up. In order to reduce overload and improve consistency, each
Presidency is supported by a Troika, consisting of the preceding, the sitting and the upcoming The decision to establish the position of a HR-CFSP back in 1996/97 followed a French proposal for the creation of a ministerial level figure that would ensure continuity, table policies and represent the Union to the outside world (Grevi, Manca, and Quille 2004: 2) . In the end, however, largely because of British opposition, the role of the HR was restricted to:
assisting the presidency "in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy"; contributing towards the "formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions"; and engaging in political dialogue "when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency" (TEU arts 18 & 26). The HR was to act also as Secretary General of the Council, but with emphasis on the latter function. He/she was intended to fill the role of an administrator, while the role of policy-initiator was initially played down. When the time came for choosing an individual to fill the post in 1999, however, the member states had come to recognise the need for a high-profile politician rather than a diplomatic or ambassadorial figure to provide the Union with foreign policy leadership.
The choice fell on Javier Solana, a former NATO Secretary General and Spanish Foreign
Minister (Crowe 2003: 538) .
The HR was given few resources to begin with, but the rather loose job description left considerable wriggle room for Solana, who was also appointed Secretary route into the heart of the process, but unfortunately successive presidencies have not allowed him to exploit it. 4 It is a fair judgement by Crowe, therefore, that "Solana's role, while increasing, has been somewhat chequered, expanding incrementally and against rather than with Brussels" (Crowe 2003: 542) .
On the other hand, Solana does get a lot of publicity, seemingly answering a need in the media for a recognisable EU face and voice. He is by journalists routinely referred to as the EU foreign policy chief, an exaggeration by any standards, but nonetheless contributing towards consolidating his presence and weight in the political landscape. Solana has also played a key role as an intellectual entrepreneur, and by giving the EU a specifically discourse. Solana and his team were instrumental in the process that eventually led to the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), presented at the Council meeting in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and subsequently adopted by the member states (Solana 2003) . In terms of its written content, the ESS was instantly followed by a trail of analyses, routinely comparing it with the US National Security Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002 (Biscop 2004; Duke 2004; Toje 2005; Berenskoetter 2004 ). In context of the low-point in transatlantic relations at which the ESS was launched, commentators differed on whether it was to be taken as a sign of reconciliation or continued transatlantic drift, concluding invariably that the US and Europe agreed on the threats, but parted ways on the means to tackle them.
Perhaps more important than its content was, however, the process by which it came about.
The ESS was produced and agreed upon surprisingly quickly, as well as being clearer, shorter and refreshingly free from the bureaucratic lingo that one would perhaps have expected from the EU, with its previous track record of "constructive ambiguity" (Heisbourg 2000 ). This
would not have been possible without the individual and institutional capacities that had been built over the latter years. When Solana was mandated to produce a "European Strategy (more and more exclusively) to Solana and his team to produce them" (Bayles 2005: 8) . In the process that ensued, the drafting was kept under close control by a small team of Solana's associates. After a run-up, in which the member states and the Commission were heavily involved, the final document was then adopted without difficulty at the Council meeting in Brussels on 12 December 2003. What stands out from these events is the novelty and, indeed, efficiency of the process, which represented a "working style" that went beyond the traditional intergovernmental procedures of the Council.
A key element of this working style has been to individualise responsibility for specific regions or policy areas, which has resulted in a steadily growing team of specialist diplomats who answer directly to Solana. whereas other EUSRs resemble rather UN special envoys than policy initiators, giving the EU a "face" but perhaps not so much a "voice" on the ground.
Given the differences in how the office of each EUSR is exercised, which often rely as much on the individual who holds it as the political context for each deployment, there seems to be some uncertainty as to what exactly the EUSRs are there for, both at home and in the regions in which they are deployed. Also, exactly when and where to appoint them comes across as arbitrary, whereas their role vis-à-vis the Commission delegations remains fuzzy. As long as 5 Solana reportedly favours personal relations over institutions. His approach has also been refreshingly hands on (as in non-bureaucratic). It is important, however, that this practical orientation is balanced with the establishment of permanent structures, not merely because there will be a time after Solana, but also because of the need for accountability and transparency in how the different functions are carried out. 6 Whereas Ashdown was seen as a typical "fixer", the current EUSR in BiH, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, has been described as more of an "administrator".
their respective powers are not clarified, the danger is that the multitude of agents of EU foreign policy adds to the present confusion rather than supplies the Union with efficient external representation. The EUSRs' claim to represent the Union-and indeed Solana's attempts to establish a more pro-active role for the HR-is constrained both by the fact that the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP gives little leeway for them to act independently, and by the fact that they share their competence with the Commission. The usefulness of a personal Union only stretches so far as the member states and the current institutional set-up allow.
The Limits and Strengths of Institutionalised Cooperation
When it comes to institutional change, or lack of such, the Constitutional Treaty explicitly One concern regarding the size of the Policy Unit has been the increase in workload due to the enlargement process and the expansion of issues that are dealt with under the CFSP. Some have envisioned an expanded Policy Unit to form the core of a cabinet to support the Foreign Minister. For a while, Policy Unit representatives were also double-hatted (some still are), simultaneously heading one of the regional or functional task forces under DG-E, in an attempt to incorporate them more in the day-to-day work of the Council Secretariat, which already has some 400 plus people involved in the CFSP. Currently, however, the unit has been kept small, so that it may retain its most important role, which is to work as the hub of a network with direct and deep contacts in the member states.
The work mode of the Council has to some extent eased the formal constraints put on EU foreign policy-making by its voting procedures and, thus, contributed towards the efficiency of the CFSP-probably more so than the expansion of majority voting envisioned in the Constitutional Treaty would have. It has, however, only marginally improved the overall efficiency and coherence of EU external action, which involves also the Commission.
Despite the overlap in tasks between the Council and the Commission, there is a welldocumented lack of coordination between the two both in Brussels and on the ground. In the past, the blurring of lines of responsibility between the Commission and the Council has inevitably created some tension, which in turn has soured relations between the two.
Some of the grudges on the Commission side may, however, be partly justified insofar as the CFSP has involved a gradual "second pillarization" of the Union's foreign and security policy. Responsibilities have shifted from the Commission to the Council, for example in the area of civil protection, which has not only caused resentment on behalf of the Commission, but also spurred some principal concerns. The removal of responsibilities away from the Commission means removing policies away from the scrutiny of the European Parliament, in addition to taking away the financial certainty that follows from inclusion in the community budget. At the same time, the ad hoc mode in which the CFSP has evolved has given little room for national parliaments to scrutinise government decisions pertaining to EU foreign policy. Looking into the EU's first military missions, operations Concordia in FYROM and
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DPRC), Giovanna Bono found that governments had informed national parliaments only after the decision to launch an operation had been made in the European Council. She also found that some governments used the pretext of lack of time and different forms of urgent procedures in order to bypass national parliaments (Bono 2005) .
A foreign policy crafted in the corridors and backrooms in Brussels may in itself represent a democratic problem. Surely, it has facilitated efficiency, but at the cost of transparency, since
Council minutes tell us very little about such behind the scenes policy-making, and accountability, insofar as neither the Presidency, the member states, nor Solana are made to answer for or forced to follow up on decisions made by the Council. At the same time, the collectiveness of the Union has been strained by enlargement, such that the foreign policy leadership assumed by the bigger member states-although always a significant element-has perhaps become more profound lately.
Towards a Directoire?
One response to the lack of foreign policy leadership in the EU has over the years been the tendency to form inner leadership groups. Indeed, most of the major steps in the history of the CFSP, until Maastricht known as the European Political Cooperation (EPC), have relied, more or less, on the initiative and common will of the big EU-3-France, Britain and Germany.
The growing difficulties of reaching consensuses within a community of 25 and the Council Presidencies' lack of resolve when dealing with important foreign policy issues, especially when held by smaller member states, together with the rise in ambitions and stakes in EU foreign policy, have only reinforced the need for the leadership provided by this group. With the notable exception of the war in Iraq, the notion of the EU-3 also seems to have become more commonplace as well as accepted by the smaller member states, to the extent that one might talk about a more or less formalised directoire (Hill 2004) .
A move in this direction became evident as focus fell on Iran's nuclear programme, following that which at the time seemed a successful intervention in Iraq. The EU-3, wanting to avoid to provide the EU with foreign policy leadership as a crisis mounted in a region, which has been referred to as one of the topmost priority areas for the Union. On the one hand, the European response to these events confirmed that Europe cannot trust the EU-3 to provide it with the foreign policy leadership needed, even in a situation where the member states for the most part see eye to eye. On the other, it showed that other member states are able and willing to take the lead if and when the EU-3 fails to do so, confirming rather the notion of foreign policy leadership by variable geometry than a move towards a formalised directoire model.
As variable geometry goes, groups of member states may choose to deepen foreign policy cooperation and move forward with structured cooperation (Constitutional Treaty, art. I-41.6), or they can set up more or less formalised contact groups (as with Poland and Lithuania in the Ukraine), which cater to individual foreign policy interests and take advantage of existing diplomatic relations and historic ties. 9 This latter ability to appear in different configurations can be seen as an important asset of the EU. More variable geometry can also create an intra-European dynamic where different states are induced to take the lead within the stronger EU bloc rather than going it alone; and get their reward in receiving ownership of EU foreign policy. A more consistent and efficient policy could in turn be ensured by formalising a "contact group+1" model including Solana, either as HR-CFSP or Union Foreign Minister. However, Solana, seemingly "all over the place" already, cannot be expected to do everything or be everywhere at the same time. 10 Also, as so often before last summer's events showed that once a crisis loomed and national foreign policies were at stake, the chance to let Solana take an early lead was forfeited.
Conclusion
The debates in the Convention showed that there is backing for a Union Foreign Minister and thus a reason to go forward with the idea (Grevi, Manca, and Quille 2004: 4 ). The member states will not be dictated from Brussels in matters where national interests are at stake, and Solana has indicated that he will not attempt to do so, regardless of whether his title is High Representative or Foreign Minister. It remains to be seen, however, whether Solana will, indeed, assume a more pro-active role if or when he is eventually granted more authority.
When it comes to gains in terms of a more coherent EU foreign policy, integrating first and second pillar instruments, the double-hatting of the Union Foreign Minister would also be of 10 The overload issue in the EU's external relations is commented upon in Gomez and Peterson 2001. limited value. The personal union solution comes across as a second best, insofar as the institutional set up remains largely the same, and the post will inevitably be subjected to traditional conflicts of interest, a concern that Solana himself and others have, indeed, raised.
It would, however, probably be a good idea to extend Solana's role to cover the whole of the Europe tends to be sceptical of whatever is perceived as a centralisation of power in Brussels.
